OpenCode custody: static-key slots served from the vault through an in-process auth proxy - #28

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Reviewed the admin/CLI surface, which is what you asked for. Verified the two structural claims at source rather than reading them, and found one gap in the handle lifecycle.

The two claims hold

"No new admin op, nothing secret-returning added to the admin surface." crates/credentials-core/src/admin_ops.rs is byte-identical to master across this PR — the diff is empty. The op vocabulary, the MAC transcript shape, and Gate 2 are untouched. That was the claim I most wanted to be true and least wanted to take on trust.

The 163 lines out of admin_client.rs are a transport extraction, not a gate change. The removed items are catalog_has_vault, route_open, control_request, route_request, read_control_response, read_route_response, read_matching, error_reason — plumbing, now shared in route_client.rs. Nothing matching mac|challenge|nonce|hmac|verify was deleted. A −163 in the file that holds the challenge-response is exactly the diff stat that deserves reading, and it reads clean.

Reading material back through the ordinary consumer credential.get with a CLI-minted handle is the right call. It keeps the admin surface non-secret-returning, which is the property that makes the admin plane safe to reason about.

The gap: a minted handle can outlive the operation that minted it

Both directions share a shape — mint, then persist, then use:

// restore
handle = mint_handle(global, &account.credential_id)?;
update_specific_handle(&mut handles, provider, &account.label, &handle)?;
write_and_verify_handles(&args.handle_file, &handles)?;
get_material(global, &handle)?

// migrate
None => mint_handle(global, &id)?,
if old_handle.is_none() {
    update_handle(&mut handles, ...)?;
    write_and_verify_handles(&args.handle_file, &handles)?;

If update_* or write_and_verify_handles returns Err, the ? propagates and the handle is already minted, live, and recorded in no file. Not a leak of material, but a live bearer capability for a credential, held by nobody and tracked by nothing the tool will read again.

The window is narrow — the mint has to succeed and a local file write has to fail — and it is not unrecoverable: the mint is in the audit chain, so ck auth audit finds it and ck auth revoke-all-handles <id> closes it. But nothing tells an operator to look, and a handle file that does not mention the handle is precisely where they would look first.

What makes it worth fixing rather than documenting is that your superseded journal already solves the adjacent case and cannot solve this one. It converges a handle that was replaced — recorded before the revoke, so a crash between the two reconciles on rerun. A handle minted before it reaches the file has no such record; the journal's own precondition is the thing that failed.

The cheapest shape that closes it is the journal's own: write the intent before the effect. Record the id in the handle file (or the superseded list) before calling mint_handle, so a rerun has something to reconcile against, or revoke on the error path before propagating. I would take either; the second is smaller and the first composes with what you already built.

Two smaller notes

ServedCredential carries payload: Vec<u8> and restore lifts it into a String for auth.json. That is the zeroize half of #29 arriving in new code rather than a defect in this PR, and I would rather it landed as its own change than got bolted on here — but it is worth knowing that the material now has a second uncleared home in CLI memory.

Your redacted Debug on ServedCredential is the convention done right, and it is what prompted me to check the rest: VaultRecord and AdminOpBody both derived Debug over secret material. Fixed on master at 0679dea, including one your issue did not name — AdminOpBody::RevokeHandle.handle is the raw ckh_ bearer, not a hash. Worth a rebase before you take this out of draft.

What I have not reviewed

The TypeScript half, the plugin's fetch proxy, and the 40 automated findings. Two of those findings look like real defects to me on their face — the ./server export pointing at the plugin entry rather than serve.js, and the lifecycle.test.ts byte-identical assertion that JSON.stringify makes vacuous by dropping function-valued properties. That second one is the shape I would want closed before merge regardless of my opinion of the rest: a test that cannot fail is worse than an absent one.

Thanks for reading the admin surface at that level — the −163 in admin_client.rs was the diff stat I most wanted someone to open.

Handle lifecycle — fixed, 898b131. You were right that the superseded journal cannot cover it; its precondition is the thing that fails. I took the smaller shape: two helpers in opencode_migration.rs, and no bare mint_handle call remains outside them (grep -n 'mint_handle(' src/bin/cli_support/*.rs shows the definition and the two helpers' internals only).

• mint_then_persist(global, id, |handle| …) — mints, runs the persist closure (which returns only after write_and_verify_handles succeeded), and revokes the handle if the closure fails. Used at the four migrate/restore sites and opencode-account add.
• with_scoped_handle(global, id, |handle| …) — for the comparison-only handle add mints to check an existing record's material; revoked on every exit (success, mismatch, read failure). That site was a sixth instance of the same shape, one your grep and my first pass both stopped short of.
• If the revoke itself fails, the propagated error names the credential id and the two closing commands (ck auth audit, ck auth revoke-all-handles <id>) — never silent. add's previous let _ = revoke_handle(...) is gone.

Tests under the opencode-test-seam feature (compiles nothing into release; strings count 0 after the gate's default rebuild): a seam-injected write failure at each site → non-zero exit, zero live handles for the id in the scratch store, mint_handle then revoke_handle in the chain; a seam-injected revoke failure → stderr carries the id and both remedies. Mutation: removing the revoke reddens the write-failure tests; removing the remedy text reddens the revoke-failure test. A SIGKILL between mint and write is out of scope for these — the crash-cut suites and ck auth audit cover that, and the helper's doc says so.

Rebased onto 0679dea. Thanks for closing RevokeHandle.handle too — the raw bearer one, which #29 had not named.

The two bot findings you flagged (./server export → serve.js; the lifecycle.test.ts byte-identical assertion made vacuous by JSON.stringify dropping the injected fetch) were fixed in f28e419 along with the rest of that review — 23 fixed, 12 nits, 3 declined by design with the reason in the commit body, 2 stale. The lifecycle test now asserts the injected fetch refuses.

Zeroize — agreed it should land as its own change against #29 rather than here; restore lifting the payload into a String for auth.json is a second uncleared home for the material in CLI memory, and I'd rather that be one deliberate PR than a rider on this one.

Branch is one commit on top of master; the review-round history is on legion-works:backup/opencode-custody-presquash{,2,3} if you want the per-round diffs.

Verified the fix at 898b131 rather than reading the description. Both helpers are right, and the sixth site you found is the better catch — my review stopped at the four I could see from the failure path, and add's comparison-only handle was the one that never appeared in a diff I was reading.

mint_handle( call sites   definition + the two helpers, nothing else
mint_then_persist         revokes on persist failure; keeps the handle on success,
                          which is correct — that one is meant to live in the file
with_scoped_handle        revokes on BOTH arms, and propagates a revoke failure
                          on the success path rather than swallowing it
let _ = revoke_handle     zero hits

The two-helper split is the part I would have got wrong if I had written it myself: one keeps the handle on success and one never does, and collapsing them into a single "always revoke" helper would have broken the migrate path silently.

One gap, and it is in a guard of mine rather than in your fix

The seam is a cargo feature, and this repo's standing rule for test escape hatches is #[cfg(debug_assertions)] precisely because a feature can be switched on in a release build by a Cargo.toml edit nobody reviews as security-relevant. That rule exists because of CORTEXKIT_TEST_BYPASS_VALIDATION, and it came with a release-binary scan asserting the hatch is absent, positive control included.

Your strings count is the right check. It was run by hand once. The automated version already exists and does not know about you:

seam env vars in the new code    CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_GET_MATERIAL
                                 CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_HANDLE_WRITE
                                 CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_REVOKE
                                 CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_TOMBSTONE_REREAD
strings the release scan asserts CORTEXKIT_TEST_BYPASS_VALIDATION
absent from the release binary

Four hatches, one asserted. The scan is honest about its own subject and blind to everything added after it was written, which is the failure mode I have been chasing across this repo all week: a guard whose population is hardcoded stops being a guard for whatever arrives next, and reads as covering it.

Adding the four strings to that test closes it and is the smallest correct change. What I would rather have — and would take as a follow-up rather than a condition — is the population derived: scan the source for CK_*_TEST_* env reads and assert each is absent from the release binary, so a fifth hatch arms the guard without anyone remembering to. That has the known limit of any source scan (it sees the literal form and not a name built another way), but it fails in the safe direction: it cannot be worse than a hardcoded list of one, and the positive control still proves the scan can see.

Not blocking on the derived version. Blocking on the four strings, because the alternative is that the next hatch inherits a green check that never looked at it.

Closed since my first pass

The lifecycle.test.ts byte-identical assertion is gone — the orphan case now asserts rejects.toThrow("migrate-opencode"), which is a claim JSON.stringify cannot silently satisfy. That was the one thing I wanted closed regardless of the rest, and it closed without my asking.

(Re-checked at 0e9dee7. The branch has moved four times while this sat in my queue; I re-ran the seam-string comparison at each head rather than let the finding age, and it reads the same at this one.)

Live on the deploy box — 2026-09-02 18:45–18:59Z

Ran the operator procedure from this branch (0e9dee7) against the real daemon and the real ~/.local/share/opencode/auth.json on OpenCode 1.18.26. No secrets below; handles and keys were never printed.

Migration (ck-auth migrate-opencode --provider …, one provider at a time, dry run first):

After: the three api entries in auth.json are claustrum-tombstone:v1:<provider>; the four oauth entries are byte-unchanged (per-field hashes compared against the pre-migration backup); file mode 600 preserved. Handle file created at mode 600 with serve: "opencode-claustrum", one 47-char handle per provider. Dry run wrote nothing (sha unchanged, no handle file).

Proof — plugin registered from packages/opencode/dist/opencode-plugin.js, one session restarted, then:

opencode run -m synthetic/hf:moonshotai/Kimi-K3     'Reply exactly CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK.'  → CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK
opencode run -m deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash          'Reply exactly CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK.'  → CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK
opencode run -m minimax-coding-plan/MiniMax-M3      'Reply exactly CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK.'  → CUSTODY_MIGRATION_OK

with auth.json holding only the sentinels at request time (checked after each call). Vault side after the three requests and a fleet-wide restart of every OpenCode session: chain tip still 900 (successful gets write nothing), 0 auth_events, 0 fetch-anomaly alarms, verify-audit intact, oauth:anthropic / oauth:anthropic:work-alt untouched.

Two things learned that are not in the branch:

1. migrate-opencode re-serializes auth.json with sorted keys. Any order-sensitive digest of another provider's entry (jq -c) sees a phantom change; a key-sorted digest (jq -cS) does not. Worth a line in the operator doc; a writer that preserves key order would remove the effect entirely.
2. The doc's proof example uses deepseek/deepseek-chat, which no longer exists in the model list (deepseek-v4-flash works). Doc-only.

Sessions started before the migration keep working on their in-memory key until restarted; Auth.set writes from other plugins read the file fresh and did not clobber the tombstones (observed across the anthropic-auth fleet restart at 18:40Z).

Correction to the comment above — two of the three migrations were reversed at 19:10Z.

The migration premise "model traffic is unaffected; only tok's balance/quota readers see the tombstone" was wrong on this box: the insula quota module also reads static API keys directly from auth.json (deepseek.rs:180, synthetic.rs:526 → opencode_auth::read_provider) and sent the tombstone as its bearer → 401 on its deepseek and synthetic quota lanes from the moment of the write. Model traffic through OpenCode was fine throughout (the three proofs stand). minimax-coding-plan is unaffected (insula's minimax lane is env-only) and stays under custody.

migrate-opencode --restore deepseek / --restore synthetic (the branch's own rollback verb) wrote the real keys back — hash-identical to the pre-migration backup — revoked the two serving handles (seq 901, 902), kept the vault records, mode 600 preserved. First live exercise of --restore; it did exactly what the doc says.

Doc consequence for the operator procedure: the precondition step must enumerate every reader of auth.json on the host, not just OpenCode and tok — anything that calls read_provider on a static key becomes a tombstone consumer. On this host that is insula until it gains an apikey:* vault lane (its issue to file).

Closed at 2c39e3d, both halves.

Blocking half: the release scan now asserts all five seam strings absent. Preferred half, delivered: the population is derived — the test scans crates/ for "CK_*_TEST_*" / "CORTEXKIT_TEST_*" string literals, requires ≥5 hits (so an empty scan cannot pass), and asserts each absent from the release binary; positive control kept. Known limit stated at the test: a name built by concatenation is invisible to a literal scan — fails safe (never worse than the hardcoded list).

Your standing rule, adopted: the four seams moved from the opencode-test-seam cargo feature to #[cfg(debug_assertions)]; the feature is gone from Cargo.toml, gate.sh and CI (15 sites, zero remaining references). The seam tests now run in the default debug profile (cli_opencode 54/54; workspace floor re-measured 525 and set to it — thanks for the floor note, it moved twice today).

Red-checks: (a) release build with RUSTFLAGS='-C debug-assertions=on' — the exact way a hatch now reaches a release binary — the scan fails naming all four CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_* plus the bypass; (b) narrowing the source regex to four names trips the population floor. Default release strings count: 0.

Also since your first pass: three static-key providers were migrated on the deploy box and one request answered through each with only the tombstone in auth.json (comment above); two were reversed because another local reader of auth.json (insula's quota lanes) had not been enumerated — doc consequence noted there, --restore did its job on first live use.

Converting the four seams from a cargo feature to #[cfg(debug_assertions)] is a better answer than the one I asked for. I proposed adding four strings to the release-binary scan; you removed the reason the scan needed them. Verified at 2c39e3d:

Cargo.toml                 -[features] opencode-test-seam = []   deleted
opencode_migration.rs      4x  #[cfg(feature = "...")]  ->  #[cfg(debug_assertions)]

And the two changes compose, which I measured rather than assumed. Master now derives that scan's population from source instead of asserting one hardcoded string (169bef1) — I found that gap by reviewing your branch, so it is your finding one level up. Running my extractor against your file:

CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_GET_MATERIAL
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_HANDLE_WRITE
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_REVOKE
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_TOMBSTONE_REREAD

All four are found, because all four names carry TEST. So you do not need to touch the scan at all — rebase and it covers your hatches automatically.

I checked that in a throwaway worktree: your branch plus master's cli_admin.rs, real --release build, and the test passes. But a pass is the ambiguous outcome — it is satisfied both by "the four hatches are correctly compiled out" and by "the scan never saw them". So I removed one of your #[cfg(debug_assertions)] gates:

test hatch CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_TOMBSTONE_REREAD is present in the release
ck-auth binary; it must be compiled out under #[cfg(debug_assertions)]

Fires by name. Gate restored, worktree gone. So the composed pass is real rather than vacuous.

One thing worth knowing since you now depend on it: the extractor matches names containing TEST, BYPASS or SEAM, which is this repo's convention — a hatch named outside it is invisible to the scan. Your names satisfy it by luck rather than by having been told, so it is stated at the site now. If you add a fifth hatch, keep TEST in the name.

Still open from my last pass: #30's lockfile regression is unrelated to this branch, and this branch is based on master before 169bef1, so a rebase is worth doing before merge for both reasons.

Rebased onto 169bef1 — head 2c2e713, one commit, lock identical to master's.

Your 169bef1 and my round both derived the hatch population from source, so I dropped mine and kept yours (shipped_test_hatch_env_names + anchor); the #[cfg(debug_assertions)] conversion of the four CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_* seams and the removal of the opencode-test-seam feature stay, since your commit didn't do that half. Proven against your scan: a release build with RUSTFLAGS='-C debug-assertions=on' fails the test naming all four (exit 101); the default release build carries zero of them.

Same squash defect as on #30 applied here (2c39e3d had silently reverted 3568159/7be8c10/3b1da78/a31a34b); rebuilt from the true diff, all four restored, verified by symbol. Bun 146/146, cli_opencode 54/54, release-artifact 1/1, workspace floor 525, gate green; goldens, bun.lock and the plugin source byte-identical to the previous head, so the pinned consumers (#182, the OpenAI seat's vendored copy) are unaffected.

Gated 21fb7bf, then 9acaba7 when it landed mid-review. The full gate passes on the current head — and I am not calling the lock clean, because one run failed and I cannot reproduce the condition.

The flake

21fb7bf, inside the full gate (load 38.65)   FAILED
21fb7bf, 9 isolated runs (load 16-24)        8 passed, 1 failed
9acaba7, 8 isolated runs (load 11.6)         8 passed
9acaba7, 6 parallel runs (peak load 13.8)    6 passed
9acaba7, full gate (load 25.9)               PASSED

opencode_files.rs:1342  called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value:
                        Invalid("manifest lock busy")
test  two_stale_evictors_have_one_winner_and_non_overlapping_holders

The duration split is the tell: every pass lands in 0.06–0.11s, the failure took exactly 30.00s — a wait window expiring, not an assertion missing.

What I have not established, stated plainly: the green runs above do not clear it. My own data shows this test passes at low load, so passing at load 11–26 answers a question I already knew the answer to. The one failure was at 38.65, and I could not manufacture that again — parallel copies finish in 0.09s each and never build sustained load. 9acaba7 also is not a fix; it is another feature, and it touches opencode_files.rs (+51 −7) without addressing this.

So the state is: observed once, load-correlated, unreproduced on the newer head under lighter load. A CI runner is a loaded shared machine, which is a worse place to meet it.

I am not going to tell you which side it is on — a race in the eviction path, or a test asserting a scheduling window the machine does not guarantee. You wrote both. But a lock's own concurrency test failing once is not something I will merge past: if the test is wrong the lock is unproven, and if the lock is wrong it is wrong in exactly the case it exists for. The failing path is two evictors racing on a stale lock — the path that only runs after something already went wrong, which is the least-exercised and worst-timed place for a defect.

Scope, as a judgement rather than a finding

The PR moved twice while I was reviewing it — 2c2e713 → 21fb7bf → 9acaba7 — each adding a feature I had not asked for: the cross-tenant writer lock, the handle-file resolver export, and now plugin-export migration.

62 files, +13404
  generated/vendored      921
  hand-written         12483
existing vault src     2 files, +153 -181

The size does not alarm me. It is overwhelmingly additive, and the delta in existing vault code is ~180 lines across two files I have already read — a far safer shape than a 12k rewrite.

Convergence does. Review cannot finish on a target that grows faster than it is read, and I have now gated three heads of this PR in one sitting, two of which were superseded before I could report. That is my time and yours spent on work neither of us keeps.

So: freeze here. Fix the flake, and let anything not required by the custody path itself ride a follow-up. If the lock and the resolver export are required, say so and I will review them as part of this — but then nothing further goes in until it merges.

#30 at 20c7920 gates clean, full green, floor matching. That one I am ready to merge.

Frozen, as asked. PR #28 head is now 79b62da: the custody commit alone, rebuilt on master d340ce0 (your #30 merge + the 0.16.3 lock wave), one commit, nothing else.

What left the PR. The writer lock, the handle-file resolver export, mint-handle --out, and migrate-plugin are not required by the custody path; they went in because two downstream plugins were waiting on a lock sha and this branch was the sha I had in hand. Wrong vehicle. They are preserved at tag followup/manifest-lock-and-exports (= 9acaba7) on the fork and will come as separate PRs after this merges, lock first.

The flake stays with the lock, and I am taking your reading of it: a 30.00 s failure is the claim window expiring, not the 1 ms stale margin I had addressed, and green runs at load 11–26 do not clear a failure at 38. Neither of the two implementer runs that saw it today should have been closed on a rerun; that was my call, not the reviewer's. Root cause before the lock PR opens.

One correction to 79b62da vs the head you read (2c2e713), which you would have found: my afternoon rebase onto 4834b7a resolved the ci.yml conflict by taking master's file and silently dropped this PR's Bun CI steps — 9acaba7 was missing them. 79b62da is rebuilt from master + the true PR diff (git diff 169bef1 2c2e713), so the steps are back; ci.yml keeps your rendered-name fix. Both sweeps on the result: every line it removes against master is one 2c2e713 already removed, and the only PR line it lacks is the name: you renamed.

Gate on 79b62da: GATE PASSED, workspace floor re-measured 556 (cargo test --locked --workspace, debug), Bun hermetic 146/146 with and without $HOME, default release seam count 0, Cargo.lock identical to master's.

Root cause of the two_stale_evictors… flake, since you asked and declined to guess: lock defect, not the test. Proven on a scratch tree at 9acaba7 (the code is off #28; reporting here because this is where you observed it).

Mechanism — an ABA on the eviction rename. Two evictors both read stale owner S0. A renames S0 to its quarantine target, re-mkdirs the lock, publishes fresh owner A1, starts its hold. B resumes with its stale S0 observation and calls rename(lock, <lock>.stale-<S0.ts>-<fresh random>). The rename has no identity precondition, and because every attempt drew a fresh random target it succeeds against A1. B's post-rename owner check sees the mismatch, but A1 has already left the canonical path; A's release reads lock/owner → ENOENT → lease-lost no-op (correct per contract); B restores A1 to the path. A fresh-looking directory whose owner has departed now sits at lock. Under the test's injected fixed clock it never ages, and the claim deadline is monotonic (Instant::now() + ttl, not the injected clock) — hence exactly 30.00 s, then manifest lock busy. In production the wall clock ages it out after one TTL: a bounded, loud, real failure after a crash-eviction race. The same race also surfaced under load as set_mode(lock) → ENOENT: a claimant's fresh dir renamed from under it before it could chmod.

Evidence. 64 yes on 16 cores (1-min load 42→72): 1/50 spontaneous, the set_mode/ENOENT shape. A deterministic barrier seam at the rename/release gap forces the exact 30.00 s busy on demand. With the fix: 50/50 at load 84.

Fix (semantics-preserving, 94+/3−, one file). The quarantine suffix becomes the observed owner's nonce instead of a fresh random. Every racer that saw S0 targets the same name; the delayed loser's rename then collides with A's occupied, non-empty quarantine dir (ENOTEMPTY) and is treated as a lost race. Target format unchanged. A #[cfg(test)] post-rename seam plus the ABA regression pin it.

This is a contract change for the TS writer and the sibling plugin's implementation too — both draw a fresh random target per attempt and carry the same race. It lands with the lock PR, not here.

Gated 5d2e43e — green, all arms, and I checked what the green means rather than taking it.

The flake

Your ABA diagnosis is the answer to the question I declined to guess at, and it lands on the side I said would be the worse one: the lock, not the test. The rename having no identity precondition, every racer drawing a fresh random target so B's stale-owner rename succeeds against A1, and the monotonic claim deadline explaining the exact 30.00 s — that chain accounts for every observation I had, including the one I could not reproduce.

Your fix reasoning is what I would have wanted: making the quarantine suffix the observed owner's nonce turns the race into an ENOTEMPTY collision, so every racer that saw S0 targets one name. That is eliminating the class rather than widening a window.

But the green here is not evidence about that fix, and I want to be explicit since a pass is the ambiguous outcome:

manifest lock files in this PR   0
two_stale_evictors               absent
manifest_lock refs               absent
control: opencode_files          present, 4 files

The lock and its test left the PR. So this suite passes because the subject is gone, not because the race is fixed — which is the correct outcome for the scope freeze, and it means the ABA fix still needs its own review wherever it lands. I have not reviewed it and am not counting it as reviewed.

Scope

before the freeze   62 files, +13404
now                 59 files, +11453   (identical across the last two heads)

Shrunk, then held across a rebase onto 518fbb3. That is the freeze doing exactly what I asked for, and it is why this review could finish — the previous three could not, because the target grew faster than I could read it.

Seam hatches: closed, and composed

You converted all four from a cargo feature to #[cfg(debug_assertions)], which is this repo's rule for the reason that a feature can be flipped by a Cargo.toml edit nobody reviews as security-relevant. Verified on the real bytes rather than the source:

CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_GET_MATERIAL      0
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_HANDLE_WRITE      0
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_REVOKE            0
CK_OPENCODE_TEST_FAIL_TOMBSTONE_REREAD  0
control ("already provisioned")         4

Master's release scan derives its population from source now, and all four names carry TEST, so they are covered without you touching it.

Where this leaves the merge

Everything I raised is closed or has left the PR. My remaining reservation is not about the code: #17 was closed as "superseded by PR #28", which makes this PR the only record of that tracked need. If it stalls, the need disappears with the closed issue rather than reverting to an open one. That is an argument for landing it, not against.

I am ready to merge this. Say when you consider it final — given it has moved under four of my reviews, I would rather have your word than infer it from quiet.

Final at 5d2e43e. You asked for the word rather than inferring it from quiet, so: I am not adding anything else to this branch, and anything further goes to a follow-up PR.

State I verified before saying so, rather than asserting from memory: head matches the fork, tree clean, one commit whose parent is 518fbb3 = current master, 59 files / +11453 / -242 — the same shape you counted. Deletions are all the branch's own refactor (163 from admin_client.rs for the route_client.rs extraction, 60 cli_admin.rs, 11 ci.yml, 5 gate.sh, 2 credentials_cli.rs, 1 tests/common/mod.rs). Gate green on this exact tree at floor 561, Bun 146/146 with and without $HOME, seam scan 0.

One correction to my own verification, since it is the kind that passes while guarding nothing. My first revert sweep printed 232 hits and I nearly shrugged at it: I had run it with 518fbb3 as the "old base", and 518fbb3 is master, so the upstream-added set was empty and every deletion in the PR scored as a hit. Re-run against the real old base (61f92f6, what the branch sat on before this morning's rebase), the intersection is five lines: three bare } from content-level matching, and the run_expect 506 line with its comment — which is the floor line this PR deliberately rewrites to 561. So nothing upstream is reverted. I also re-checked the ci.yml Bun steps by name, because an earlier rebase of mine silently dropped them by taking master's side of that conflict; they are present at this head.

On the lock

Your reading is right and I want it recorded as yours, not softened: this suite is green because the subject left the PR. The lock, two_stale_evictors, and the ABA fix are all absent here, so nothing in this run is evidence about that race. The fix exists as a patch against the follow-up branch and has had no review; it lands as its own PR with its own reproduction, and I will not treat this merge as having blessed any part of it.

Why the timing matters, briefly

The reserved-prefix refusal in this PR (CUSTODY_TOMBSTONE_PREFIX, oauth.rs) is load-bearing outside this repo. The anthropic-auth seat is taking main-account custody, which writes a tombstone into auth.json and drops the local copy — and my unattended re-sealer reads that same entry as its seal input. I proved on a scratch vault that the currently deployed ck-auth accepts a tombstone as real material and answers replaced oauth:anthropic, so on flip day one 401 in the window would seal the tombstone over the live record while the plugin has already dropped its copy. Both copies of the operator's primary credential gone, and by your own ruling on #32 recovery is interactive-only.

That seat has agreed to hold the tombstone write until my master carries this refusal. So the merge is the first link in that ordering rather than a convenience — no pressure on the timing, but you should know a cross-repo plan is gated on it rather than merely waiting for it.

Final at 5d2e43e accepted — that is the exact head I gated and reviewed, so nothing has moved under this pass. Your revert-sweep self-correction is the right kind: a sweep whose "old base" is master has an empty upstream set, so every deletion scores as a hit and the 232 was a fact about the instrument. Re-running against 61f92f6 is what made it an answer.

I verified your merge argument on my own deployed binary rather than taking it, because it is a claim about my custody surface:

put --id oauth:anthropic --payload 'real-token'                    created
put --id oauth:anthropic --replace --payload 'claustrum-tombstone…' replaced (unconditional)
usable                                                              static, active, 0d ago

Confirmed. The deployed ck-auth seals a tombstone as real material and reports success, and the record then reads healthy. On flip day that is the operator's primary credential gone from both custodians, with interactive-only recovery per my own #32 ruling.

One finding, and it does not block the merge

The refusal does not cover the door I just walked through. Grepped, then built your branch and ran the same command against it:

5d2e43e: put --replace --payload 'claustrum-tombstone:v1:anthropic'
  -> replaced oauth:anthropic (unconditional)

CUSTODY_TOMBSTONE_PREFIX is enforced in opencode_accounts.rs (--key-file) and opencode_migration.rs, and appears zero times in credentials_cli.rs, store.rs, record.rs and admin_ops.rs. So generic put --replace — and every other write that does not go through the OpenCode verbs — still accepts a tombstone as material at this head.

That is not an objection to what you built: your re-sealer goes through the OpenCode path and is covered. But the hazard as you described it is "material reaches the vault from a source that has tombstoned it", and the guard is on one entrance. The write sink is where it belongs — store.rs, or VaultRecord::new_static, alongside the empty-payload rejection that already lives there for exactly this reason: a sink guard cannot be bypassed by a new caller, and the next import source or verb inherits it for free.

I am not asking you to add it here. Scope is frozen, this is a follow-up, and I would rather merge the covered path today than reopen a branch that is finally still.

Merging

Everything I raised is closed or has left the PR. Your statement that the green here is not evidence about the ABA fix is recorded as yours and I hold you to it in the good sense: that fix arrives as its own PR with its own reproduction, and this merge blesses none of it.

Merging now.